Investigative Committee Highlights Failures Ahead Of 1995 Súðavík Avalanche

The report by Alþingi’s investigative committee into the 1995 Súðavík avalanche was presented yesterday, reports RÚV. The findings state that snow monitoring was inadequate and that there appeared to be little interest in avalanche protection in Súðavík prior to the disaster. The matter will now be taken up by Alþingi.

In January 1995, an avalanche struck Súðavík, claiming the lives of 14 people, including eight children. The tragic events are documented in the award-winning documentary Fjallið það öskrar (When the Mountain Roars in English) by Daníel Bjarnason.

Finnur Þór Vilhjálmsson, chair of the investigation committee, said that the length of time since the events had affected the investigation. Many individuals who played key roles at the time have since passed away and are no longer able to give testimony. As a result, the committee relied heavily on written sources. He also stressed that it was not the committee’s role to assign individual responsibility.

The committee did not make decisions regarding fines or compensation; its mandate was limited to reviewing decisions taken by the authorities before and after the avalanche.

According to the committee’s website, the parliamentary resolution tasked it to “compile and prepare for publication information on the circumstances of the case with the aim of shedding light on decisions and working practices of the authorities”.

This included examining how decisions on avalanche protection were made; how settlement planning took avalanche risk into account; how hazard assessments were prepared; and how information on avalanche risk was communicated to residents of Súðavík. It also covered the organisation and implementation of civil protection measures in the lead-up to the avalanche, in its aftermath, and until the danger had passed, as well as the authorities’ follow-up after the disaster.

The findings of the investigation

The investigation revealed significant shortcomings in avalanche preparedness in Iceland at the time. It was noted that the situation in Súðavík could not be examined in isolation, as similar conditions existed elsewhere in the country.

The report concludes that avalanche monitoring was inadequate in many parts of Iceland. At the beginning of the work of the Avalanche Protection Committee in 1985, strong concerns were already being raised that snow monitoring and the recording of avalanches were generally poor nationwide.

The report also notes that protective barriers were never built in Súðavík, despite the existence of hazard assessments and defence proposals by the engineering firm VST. The committee concluded that the construction of such barriers was likely considered too expensive.

Relatives of the victims sought answers to two key questions, which became a central focus of the investigation: why a meeting of the Súðavík Civil Protection Committee was not convened, and whether concerns raised by snow observer Heiðar Guðbrandsson about avalanche risk in the outer area of Súðavík above Túngata and Nesvegur were communicated to the municipal manager and the chief of police.

According to the report, Heiðar had wanted to convene the civil protection committee, but the municipal manager, who also chaired the committee, rejected the request. The chief of police reportedly asked that a meeting be held the following morning.

Sonja Hjördís Berndsen, a lawyer and staff member of the investigation committee, reviewed communications within the Súðavík Civil Protection Committee in the lead-up to the avalanche. On January 15 and into the early hours of January 16, when the avalanche struck, committee members were in contact with one another, as well as with the Icelandic Met Office and Civil Protection authorities.

Only one member of the committee is still alive today: Ólafur Helgi Kjartansson, former chief of police. He and Magnús Már Magnússon of the Icelandic Met Office are the only individuals able to give first-hand accounts of these communications.

The report states that four members of the town’s civil protection group were in telephone contact with one another that night. A decision was made to evacuate the so-called Traðargil area of Súðavík. However, the outer danger zone beneath Súðavíkurhlíð was not evacuated.

Sonja said that Heiðar’s comments indicated he had discussed the risk in the outer area with the Met Office and with Sigríður, the municipal manager, who allegedly hung up on him. Sigríður denied this in interviews, stating that Heiðar had never raised such concerns with her.

Ólafur Helgi also stated in his report to the committee that he had not been informed of Heiðar’s concerns. He further said he did not recall receiving information on the matter from the Met Office. Magnús, however, said he had discussed the risk in the outer area with both Heiðar and Sigríður.

Regarding whether a meeting was ordered during the night, Ólafur said he instructed that it take place by telephone overnight, with an in-person meeting to follow the next morning to formally record decisions. This contradicts Sigríður’s account, in which she said she was instructed by the chief of police to evacuate the area, contact committee members, and then hold a meeting the following morning.

Sonja said it was clear that information about avalanche risk in the outer area was not communicated to national civil protection authorities. Conflicting accounts also remain as to whether this information was conveyed to the municipal manager and the chief of police.

“On this point, then as now, it is one person’s word against another’s. The investigation committee cannot see how this can be resolved given the time that has passed,” Sonja said during the presentation of the report.

The report also covers the involvement of Össur Skarphéðinsson, then Minister for the Environment. He had previously stated that he had travelled to Súðavík a few days before the avalanche after hearing from snow observer Heiðar Guðbrandsson by phone. Heiðar expressed concerns that there were additional areas in Súðavík at risk beyond those on which local authorities were focusing.

Össur said that during the visit, it was clear that those accompanying him considered Heiðar’s concerns to be unfounded.

In his statement to the investigative committee, Össur said he understood from Heiðar that the existing hazard assessment had been “completely wrong.” Össur had himself reviewed the assessment immediately after the New Year and noticed that “something was off about it”.

During the visit, Heiðar reportedly led Össur up to the gully from which the avalanche would come a few days later and said: “It will come from there. The avalanche will come from there.”

Asked about his previous comments on how the municipal authorities had responded to Heiðar’s warnings, Össur said they had been “very hostile” towards him.

Alþingi appointed the investigative committee in November last year after a group of relatives and close ones of those killed in the avalanche pressed for an inquiry. For many years, the demands of Súðavík residents for an independent investigation had been ignored.

Civil Protection authorities submitted a report in January 1996, which those seeking answers considered inadequate. The group also requested that the Ministry of Justice take up the case, but this was rejected.

A request was later made for the Director of Public Prosecutions to investigate whether the Civil Protection Act had been breached, as local civil protection officials had responded improperly in the lead-up to the avalanche — including ignoring warnings from the Icelandic Met Office and failing to report the situation to national civil protection authorities. In February 1997, the Director of Public Prosecutions declined to pursue the case.

In 2004, a renewed request was made for the Director of Public Prosecutions to take up the investigation, but it was again refused. It was coverage by Heimildin in 2023 that finally revived the issue. The committee was appointed at the end of last year and began its work on January 1.

Relatives welcomed this outcome but raised objections to the wording in the explanatory statement of Parliament’s Constitutional and Supervisory Committee, which stated that in its consideration of the case the committee had “not become aware of any criminal conduct.”